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Abstract 
Mesh technology has captured the interest of university research 
and industry, because of its capacity to meet at the same time the 
requirements of Internet service provider and users.  But, its 
architecture and configuration do not ensure a protection against 
the unauthorized use of the network since the used basic security 
measures do not include the concept of mobility. Our endeavor 
in this paper is to introduce a re-authentication scheme for secure 
handoff based on an efficient mobility management. First, we 
have treated the mobility aspect. Indeed, we applied the 
Mobility  Notification Message procedure to support an 
environment which manages handoff in effective way. Then, 
using this technique, we have defined a new scheme to provide 
security during handoff. Our study shows that the proposed 
protocol can provide more protected network and more effective 
re-authentication scheme in term of minimized handoff latency 
as well as reduced blocking and loss rates. 
Keywords:  Re-authentication, Handoff, Mesh Network, 
Security, Mobility. 
1. Introduction 
The last decades have shown a very significant revolution 
for wireless networks, which results by the appearance of 
several models and techniques. These new technologies, 
which bring new services and improve the used processes, 
form the next generation of wireless networks. Mainly, we 
quote two great families for these techniques; Ad hoc 
networks and Mesh networks. 
 
These technologies are characterized by deployment 
flexibility, a facility of use and a wider cover.  Indeed, 
Mesh solutions support a diversity of advantages which 
are essentially the minimization of the network installation 
cost with a simple maintenance procedure, the robustness 
of offered networks services as well as the extension of 
the cover without touching with the reliability of the 
network. 
 
Moreover, Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) is composed 
of multiple types of entities which differ according to the 
adopted architecture.  In spite of this diversity, all these 
nodes are able to be dynamically self-organized and self-
configured. In addition, another aspect characterizing the 
relations between these nodes is the multi-hop 
transmission. 
This procedure makes it possible to build several paths 
between various components of network in order to reach 
the target. Thereafter, it may help to solve the problem of 
corrupted paths, which is caused by the disconnection or 
the breakdown of an entity inside the network.  
 
This type of network may take all its interest only when a 
standard is associated to it. Indeed, the IEEE (Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers) formed the 802.11 
Task Group "s" (TGs) in 2004 to prepare a standard 
amendment for WMN. This future standard (IEEE 802.11s) 
defines a whole of terminologies which will be adopted in 
the remainder of this study.   
 
First of all, any node which supports the Mesh services 
such as control, management, and configuration of 
network is a Mesh Point (MP).  If the node supports in 
more the access to stations (STAs) or to the nodes which 
do not have the Mesh services it is called a Mesh Access 
Point (MAP).  Moreover, a Mesh Portal Point (MPP) is a 
MP which has a connection with Internet and the external 
networks. 
 
Although we notice the significant advantages of WMN 
successful deployment in the whole world, some technical 
limitations and problems will remain to be solved and will 
probably require more advanced research for the 
deployment of such a network [1]. For example, we quote 
the quality of service, the security, the mobility 
management and the interference problem. 
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A principal challenge in WMN is the supply of the 
mobility, which constitutes a principal need in wireless 
communications, since network users are increasingly 
mobile due to the massive deployment of wireless 
technologies. This new generation of clients, who seek to 
communicate during their displacements without any 
constraint of connectivity, and where the network change 
needs to be completely transparent, pushed the 
researchers’ community to propose a whole of solutions 
and studies to solve these problems.   
 
To make it possible to users to carry out an effective and 
reliable handoff (i.e. a change of point of attachment for a 
client while being in communication) as well as a secure 
access to the offered services in Mesh network, a study of 
security aspect should be carried out during the moving of 
mobile nodes from an MAP to another and through 
various domains. Indeed, mobility mechanism cannot 
prove its effectiveness only if it is associated to well 
defined and studied security mechanism in order to 
provide access to Mesh network only to authorized nodes. 
This aspect becomes increasingly critical toward the 
growth of various attacks which can be carried out in an 
open medium environment and with a variable topology. 
 
The goal of this study is to design a re-authentication 
scheme for secure handoff in the wireless Mesh network 
based an efficient mobility management. First, we begin 
our study with the treatment of mobility problem. Indeed, 
we applied the Mobility  notification Message (MNM) 
procedure to support an environment which manages 
handoff in effective way. Based on this technique, we 
define a new scheme to provide the security network 
during the node handoff. 
 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we give some related works. In Section 3, we 
describe the details of our re-authentication protocol. In 
Section 4, we analyze and evaluate the performance of our 
proposed scheme. Finally, we conclude the study in 
Section 5. 
2. Related Work 
WMN brings several advantages such as the facility and 
the flexibility of deployment.  The prime objective of this 
type of network is to offer a flexible connectivity to the 
mobile users. Consequently, the special care must be taken 
by handling the mobility. In our study, we are interested in 
stations mobility. Due to the importance of this challenge, 
various solutions were proposed in the literature in order 
to solve the problem of lack of security during handoff. 
Among which we quote the example of SMesh (Seamless 
Mesh) [2], WMM mechanism [3], Protocol for Macro 
Mobility and multi-homing notification and also Geo-
mobility and location service in spontaneous WMN.  
 
The stations in SMesh are connected automatically to the 
network by the standard DHCP. SMesh proposes its own 
solution to solve the handoff problem. This suggested 
approach can be considered effective since it doesn't 
include the client in the procedure of handoff neither 
changes its device nor introduced additional software.  On 
the other hand, the mobile nodes only have localization’s 
precision of 2 seconds.  Moreover, a heavy signaling 
overhead was produced by the diffusion of DHCP requests 
by the station at each 2 seconds and also created in case 
where several MAP have good connectivity with certain 
client, the data packets of this client will be duplicated.  
 
A second vision to solve the problem of mobility 
management in Mesh network is presented in this work [4]. 
This study proposes a new model of location service based 
on a whole of principles. First of all, this approach 
separates between the allotted addresses, which change 
according to the geographical location of the node, and 
their persistent identifiers, which remain unchangeable in 
spite of these movements. Then, this separation requires 
the presence of mapping service for these last parameters 
and to each station to be located whenever its site. This 
idea is carried out by the installation of "Distributed 
Location Service" mechanism which is central additional 
equipment in the network.   
 
This approach requires a long handoff latency since each 
transmission must have recourse to this service to apply 
the correspondence identity/address and also each 
displacement must be announced in this new equipment. 
Consequently, this procedure requires too much signaling 
overhead and very considerable handoff latency. 
Concerning the security aspect, the suggested model 
supposes the existence of confidence relations between 
various components inside network, except the clients, 
which contradicts the reality of wireless networks. In this 
same context, this mechanism does not take into account 
the risks and the attacks which can proceed inside Mesh 
network at the time of handoff. 
 
The mobility management is a very wide issue of research 
and can be treated from various sides. Indeed, the macro 
mobility is a type of mobility, which is carried out 
between various domains inside Mesh network. In this 
context, the study [5] proposes a notification protocol 
driven by the access points and independently of the used 
routing protocol. In this approach, the access points detect 
the clients’ macro mobility by the change of addresses. 
Following this detection, the MAPs send to source node a 
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parameters. This message will be sent at each 60 seconds 
for each client, which may cause a heavy additional 
signaling overhead within Mesh network. As the previous 
study, this approach is studied independently of the 
security aspect. The innovation brought by WMM is the 
use of the options field in the header of an IP packet to 
store the station location information in each MP. But 
when there is no handoff, these additional bytes aren’t 
necessary. Thus, the proposed method requires a heavy 
implementation and many procedures. Especially, the 
query procedure involves flooding signaling messages to 
the WMN, which results in signaling overhead to the 
system. WMM as others studies, which treats only 
mobility, their medium remains open and the traffic can be 
easily listened or modified.  
 
In this context, security becomes a principal necessity. The 
issue of insecurity becomes increasingly vulnerable and 
critical during handoff that requires the application of an 
effective policy and well defined security.  We mention in 
the remainder of this section some solutions suggested 
recently solving the security problem. The mechanism [6] 
is based on the use of a "token" of authentication which is 
dynamically produced during a handoff by the moving 
station.  In this solution, the structure of the "token" is not 
defined as well as the manner of the generation of this 
parameter which will be present at the level of the station 
and the authentication server at the same time 
(synchronization between the stations and the server). 
Furthermore, with each handoff, the server intervenes in 
the re-authentication phase between a given station and his 
new MAP what carries out to overload the server then to 
increase the handoff latency and degrade the quality of 
network. We notice also the "token" duplication risk or the 
generation of the same "token" on another station. 
 
In addition, the authors of [7] introduce a Two-Factor 
localized authentication model for a handoff   inter-
domain (i.e. the station moves between MAPs which 
belong to the same Mesh). Although this solution proves 
its effectiveness in several cases of attack and lack of 
security, the proposed model use a removable support to 
store confidential information which amplifies the risk of 
attack, theft and even the loss of this device. This scheme 
uses a central entity which carries out several tasks so the 
architecture becomes centralized, that may multiplies the 
risks of attack and disturbs the correct functioning of 
network. This model uses several parameters that require 
so much memory capacity to store this information in 
different devices. 
 
Moreover, [8] introduces a secure authentication technique 
that can be conveniently implemented for the ad-hoc 
nodes forming clients of an integrated WMN, thus 
facilitating their inter-operability. The proposed 
authentication scheme is based on using EAP-TTLS 
(Extensible Authentication Protocol-Tunneled Transport 
Layer Security) over PANA (Protocol for carrying 
Authentication Network Access). The EAP-TTLS extends 
EAP-TLS to exchange additional information between 
client and server by using secure tunnel established by 
TLS negotiation. 
 
In spite of the diversity of the benefit brought by this 
approach such as a level of security of the stations similar 
to that proven for EAP-TLS but with very simple 
implementation and also flexibility by employing any 
authentication protocol, it remains some anomalies to be 
rectified. First, the discovery and handshake phase, 
executed before the establishment of the secure tunnel, is 
prone to spoofing attacks and the threat of man in the 
middle by a malicious node as data are sent in clear. 
Second, this study did not take into account the notion of 
mobility and handoff in WMN. Finally, this approach 
presents a long procedure of authentication that may result 
in a heavy signaling overhead.  
 
With an aim of solving the problem of lack of security 
following mobility phase, the study [9] seeks to design a 
pre-authentication model for fast handoff with mobile 
Access points (APs).  This approach improved existing 
methods, particularly Mishra et Al technique [10], to be 
applicable inside WMN environment. Besides, the 
suggested model avoids the chained relation between the 
whole of PMKs (Pairwise Master Keys) in neighbors 
graph with an aim of solving the problem of the pre-
authentication. Moreover, the authors applied Du et al. 
method [11] for PMKs generation and for keys pre-
distribution procedure. The principle of this last technique 
is based on Blom model [12] which uses a set of matrices 
in order to manage the secret keys.   
 
Although the suggested solution presents a secure 
mechanism for handoff as well as an effective 
management of keys, it still suffers from a whole of limits. 
First of all, the procedure of matrices diffusion used in this 
scheme requires the transmission of a great number of 
values for all Mesh network components. Consequently, 
this can cause a heavy signaling overhead.   
 
Second, this model requires a huge amount of calculation 
to be carried out and treated in order to extract the 
matrices. Then, to extend the Mesh cover, we proceed 
simply by the addition of access points. As a result of this 
network extension, the authentication server must change 
the matrices which are used for client authentication and 
re-authentication procedure because these various matrices 
depend on network size (i.e. the number of present MAPs). IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 8, Issue 3, No. 2, May 2011 
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3. Proposed Scheme 
In this section, we describe the principle of our proposed 
re-authentication protocol, which is applicable in Wireless 
Mesh Network. First of all, we define the adopted 
architecture of our study environment to facilitate the 
implementation of our suggested solution. Our studied 
issue can be divided into two great phases. The first aspect 
is the mobility since we will be interested in the nodes 
mobility management, which is known as handoff. The 
major problem which is derived from mobility is security. 
Indeed, this second aspect makes it possible to eliminate 
risks, attacks and vulnerable actions in Mesh network.   
3.1 Network Architecture 
In order to be able to apply our re-authentication protocol, 
we need to specify the architecture of the adapted 
environment. In our study, we have slightly modified the 
terminology used in the draft D2.0 of IEEE 802.11s 
(described in the introduction section) [13]. Moreover, we 
selected the hierarchical architecture because it presents 
the most adapted approach for mobility and security 
treatment as well as it has the most powerful platform, 
which is compatible with Mesh network requirements and 
challenges. This choice is based on a comparative study 
made between three types of architecture; centralized, 
distributed and hierarchical.  
 
Indeed, the work [14] presents a study on the 
authentication behavior for mobile nodes in Wireless 
Mesh Network. This study evaluated the latency and the 
resources consumption of authentication inside this same 
type of network and by considering the nodes mobility. 
Following this comparison, the results showed that 
hierarchical architecture provided the fastest handoff 
behavior since in case of re-authentication the data and the 
authentication latency will be more reduced as well as the 
elimination of the congestion on the level of a unique 
authentication entity.  
  
In our hierarchical architecture and as shown in Fig. 1, the 
network is divided into groups called "Clusters". For each 
group or cluster, we select a Mesh Access Point as a head 
of group called "Cluster Head", noted CH. This selected 
MAP will drive the different operations proceeding inside 
each domain such as; load balancing between MAPs, 
access control, decision of handoff authorization, etc.In 
addition, MAPs nodes in IEEE 802.11s draft are by 
definition stationary to provide more stable and invariable 
architecture. But this condition does not meet the needs 
and requirements wished of Mesh network deployment 
where mobility is the first aspect to be respected.  Then to 
ensure a closer architecture reality and more adjusted with 
clients' hopes, it is necessary to hold in account the 
mobility of MAPs. This architecture is used with an aim of 
facilitating the implementation of mobility and re-
authentication protocol explained in the next subsections.   
 
Fig. 1  The adopted Mesh network Architecture for the proposed solution. 
3.2 Handoff: Mobility Management 
After having fixed the architecture of our study on which 
we will implement our re-authentication protocol, we will 
be interested in the first aspect, which is mobility. 
Moreover, we cannot solve the lack of security problem 
during handoff without initially ensuring an effective 
mobility protocol. Indeed, this aspect facilitates the 
integration of the re-authentication protocol and the 
preparation of a suitable platform. The purpose of such 
mobility protocol is to supervise and follow the location 
information change of the various nodes inside the 
network. 
 
The prime objective of Wireless Mesh Network is to offer 
a supple connectivity to mobile users. However, the ease 
of communication should not make forget the new risks 
introduced by these techniques. Indeed, in Mesh network 
the clients (mobile by definition) are likely to move from a 
cell (Mesh node cover) to another. Moreover, the 
protocols, intended to manage mobility in wired networks, 
give bad results on this new technology. So the installation 
of a mobility mechanism (roaming) will be a crucial issue 
for services continuity and consequently the special care 
must be taken by handling these subjects.  
 
In Mesh network, there are various mobility types; users’ 
mobility and network devices mobility. Besides, this 
aspect has several levels:  intra-cluster and inter-cluster 
mobility. For the first type, the displacements of clients are 
limited to the cover of only one cluster. On the other hand, 
the various network components are likely to roam from a 
cluster to another. In our work, we are interested in these 
various aspects of mobility. Thus, we refer to the mobility 
of the users simply by the term handoff.   
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way inside Mesh network, we allot to each client an 
identity. This parameter is obtained since the connection 
establishment and following a success authentication of a 
new client. This procedure allows to provide a secure and 
robust network which can be protected against the various 
attacks and to avoid the anonymity problem.  The 
identities attribution phase does not relate only to clients 
but rather all the other Mesh network components. Indeed, 
each MAP and each CH has a preset identity since the 
connection of the considered node. These additional 
parameters will be used to prove the device validity using 
some other information. Concerning the allotted identities 
to a client, who is already disconnected from the network, 
they will be added, by the Mesh Access Point (MAP) 
associated with this client, to the list of revoked identities. 
Thereafter, this list will be updated in the corresponding 
Cluster Head in Mesh network so that identities list cannot 
be re-used by another client.  
 
Mobility Notification Message (MNM): In this part, we 
are interested in the study of inter-cluster and intra-cluster 
mobility of clients inside the Mesh network. In order to 
achieve this purpose, we need to supervise the location 
information of each component and to follow their 
displacements in the network. The idea is based on the use 
of the notification message notion. Then, following the 
displacement of one of the component, a notification 
message will be sent with an aim of informing the other 
entities by the movement. This study differs according to 
the carried out mobility type. 
  Intra-cluster Mobility   
Mobility is carried out within the same cluster. In this 
case, we are interested primarily in the displacement of 
clients between different MAPs. Indeed, Cluster Head 
(CH) has to communicate a notification message to mobile 
client with an aim of assigning its new credentials and also 
proving to this node the validity and the legitimacy of its 
associated CH. This procedure aims at updating the 
location information of each station inside Mesh network 
following the displacements of these components.   
  Inter-cluster Mobility 
In In this type of displacement, a component (client or 
MAP) crosses the cover zone of another neighbor cluster. 
Consequently, the new CH (CHnew) should inform the old 
CH (CHold) by this location change through sending a 
notification message. This operation makes it possible to 
ensure two main functionalities. First one is to notify 
CHold by the displacement of certain entity and thereafter 
the cancellation of this later from its base. The second 
functionality consists on ensuring the legitimacy of these 
two CHs using a mutual authentication procedure. In this 
same mobility type, a second notification message, similar 
to that of intra-cluster mobility, is sent from CHnew 
towards the client.   
3.3 Security: Re-authentication Protocol 
Although there are many significant advantages and 
benefits of the Mesh networks successful deployment in 
the whole world, some technical limitations and problems 
will remain to be solved and will probably require more 
advanced research for the exploitation of such a network. 
We quote some of these weaknesses; the mobility and the 
security. However, in spite of the study of mobility aspect 
in previous sub-section, the medium remains open and the 
traffic can be easily listened or modified. In this context, 
security becomes a principal concern. Indeed, mobility 
mechanism cannot prove its effectiveness alone but only 
when it will be associated to a well defined and studied 
security mechanism. 
 
Some Possible Attacks: Attacks in WMN are very 
diverse, some are inherited from previous wireless 
technologies and others appear with the new WMN 
challenges. These threats differ on the level of the used 
techniques, the exploited faults and the desired intentions. 
Denial of services (DoS) represents the major attack 
aiming at rendering unavailable during an unspecified 
times the services and resources of a network for the 
authorized users. Generally, attackers look for faults in the 
different protocols of such a network to be incorporate in 
any system illegally: 
  Routing protocol attacks: WMN can be prone to 
many types of attacks especially DoS because of 
multi-hop environment which may cause the 
routing overheads on the level of WMR. Here are 
some of these threats: Black-hole, Grey-hole, 
Worm-hole, Route error injection, etc. 
  MAC protocol attacks: Due to the manipulation 
of an open and shared medium in WMN, the 
MAC channel may suffer from a several kinds of 
attacks such as: Passive Eavesdropping, Link 
Layer Jamming Attack, MAC Spoofing Attack, 
Replay Attack, etc. 
  Physical protocol attacks: The physical layer can 
be affected by using radio jamming devices and 
the outdoor deployment which may meddle in the 
physical channels and disturb the network 
availability.  
The diversity of attacks and the high degree of 
vulnerabilities pushed the community of the researchers to 
propose a whole of solutions to solve these problems of 
lack of security. In this context, we have proposed a new 
re-authentication, which will be described in the next 
subsection.  
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the significant measurements to protect the Wireless Mesh 
Network from different attacks, allowing only the 
authorized users to obtain connections and preventing the 
adversaries from being integrated in the network and 
disturbing its services and its operations. Moreover, to 
make it possible to the users to carry out effective and 
reliable handoff as well as a secure access to Mesh 
network services, a re-authentication method should be 
carried out during the crossing of mobile nodes through 
different MAPs and also various clusters.   
 
In this subsection, we detail our proposed re-
authentication protocol in order to guarantee a safe access 
during the handoff phase. Since the majority of attacks 
origin remains unknown and unexpected, we should not 
suppose any confidence relations between all network 
equipments. Indeed, the source of risk can be a client or a 
Mesh Access Point or even a malevolent Cluster Head. In 
our study, we treated the case of clients' mobility in the 
same cluster (intra-cluster) and between different clusters 
(inter-cluster). 
  Intra-cluster Mobility 
In case of intra-cluster handoff, the displacement of station 
is carried out from a MAP to another but while remaining 
in the same cluster. Fig. 2 shows the exchanged messages 
flow between the various components during intra-cluster 
mobility. First of all, the entities intervening in this 
exchange are:  
  Station (STA) : the mobile client which is in 
communication, 
  MAPnew  : the new Mesh Access Point of the 
mobile station, 
  CH : Cluster Head of the cluster which contains 
STA and MAPnew. 
Station STA starts the re-authentication procedure by 
sending an access message request (1). Then, MAPnew 
answers with an EAP-Request/identity request (2) which 
requires the client's identity.  Following the reception of 
this last message, the station dispatches the identity of its 
corresponding CH (IDCH), its own identity (IDSTA) 
ciphered by the session key (K) shared between the station 
and its associated CH for the preceding session (3). 
 
Before the retransmission of the last received message, 
MAPnew node adds some more information to carry out 
the mutual authentication with the CH entity. This 
information is composed by its own identity (IDMAP), a 
nonce value generated randomly (NMAP) and ResMAP 
value which represents the result of the application of the 
nonce value on a whole of the preset algorithms between 
MAPs and their CHs since their integration in network.  
Because these data present the evidence of MAPnew 
legitimacy, they should not be transmitted as 
understandable and legible information but rather 
enciphered by the public key of CH (4). After the 
reception of all these parameters, CH starts with the check 
identity phase of IDCH to know if it corresponds to its 
one. If it is not the case, we have an inter-cluster handoff. 
But, if the two identities are identical, CH continues the 
identities checking procedure in order to make sure of the 
membership of STA and MAPnew with their same cluster. 
Then, it calculates the result (ResCH) of the nonce value 
(NMAP) application on the whole of the common 
algorithms between CH and MAPnew. 
 
Then, CH compares the obtained result (ResCH) with that 
sent by MAPnew (ResMAP) to ensure the validity of this 
access point. Finally, Cluster Head extracts a new key ( K' 
) for this new session according to previous session key 
preceding ( K ) and an authentication parameter named 
(Auth) which will be later transmitted to the client. At this 
stage, CH entity is conscious of STA and MAPnew 
legitimacies and it remains to prove its validity for these 
two last components. To fulfill this, CH sends an ID 
Response message (5), enciphered by the MAPnew public 
key and containing a new nonce value (NCH), its response 
(RespCH) and the new session key ( K' ). 
 
After the reception of these parameters, MAPnew applies 
the received nonce value (NRCH) with the preset 
algorithms to obtain a result (RespMAP). Then, it 
compares its obtained result with that sent by CH 
(RespCH). If they are identical, the re-authentication 
phase is continued. If not, we stop at this stage and we 
cancel all the procedure. Thereafter, MAPnew records the 
key ( K' ) to make use of it essentially for the extraction of 
a temporary key between STA and its associated MAP.  
With an aim of informing STA by its new connection 
parameters and of proving its legitimacy, CH sends a 
message called Mobility Notification Message (MNM) 
(6). The MNM contains the value (Auth), which is used 
for the extraction of the new key ( K' ), a challenge value 
and a sequence number (SN) to avoid the risk of the replay 
attack. More additional information will be sent but in 
enciphered ways, which are the MAPnew  identity 
(IDMAP) and the response of the challenge application 
(RspCH). 
 
Following the arrival of this last message, the station 
calculates the new key ( K' ) by using the parameter 
(Auth) and it applies a hash function, which is preset 
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1. Access Request 
2. EAP-Request/identity 
3. EAP-Response/identity 
( IDCH , [IDSTA]K )  4. EAP-Response/identity 
( IDCH, [IDSTA]K, [IDMAP, 
N R ]
K )
MAPnew  CH  STA 
(RspSTA). Finally, STA compares its result with that 
received from CH (RspCH) to ensure the legitimacy of the 
concerned Cluster Head CH. 
  Inter-cluster Mobility 
In case of inter-cluster handoff, the client, which is in 
communication, changes its point of attachment and also 
its current cluster. The various intervening components in 
this type of mobility are:  
  STA: the station carrying out the displacement 
towards MAPnew, 
  MAPnew : the new point of attachment,  
  CHold : cluster head of the STA home cluster,  
  CHnew : cluster head of the new cluster containing 
MAPnew. 
Our proposed re-authentication protocol is shown in Fig. 3 
by the exchanged messages flow between the different 
components, quoted previously. The first four messages 
are identical to those indicated in the case of intra-cluster 
handoff. During this phase, we ensure the identities 
transmission of both STA and MAPnew towards CHnew. 
Then, this last entity checks the cluster membership of 
STA by testing the (IDCH) parameter. If this identity is 
identical to the current CH identity, then we treat the case 
of intra-cluster handoff, detailed in previous subsection. If 
not (i.e. (IDCHold) and (IDCHnew) are different), CHold 
seeks the CH having the given identity and then a Mobility 
Notification Message (5) will be send to the concerned 
entity. This message contains the (MICCHnew) (Message 
Integrity Code) parameter, ensuring the integrity of data 
coming from the CHnew node as well as other enciphered 
parameters using a key (Kch) divided between different 
CHs from the same Mesh network.  (Kch) is generated 
periodically to minimize the risks of possible attacks.  
 
The transmitted information are identity (IDSTA) 
enciphered by the session key ( K ), which is shared 
between CHold and STA, a (challenge1) value making it 
possible to check the CHold validity and a response 
(RespCHnew). Following the reception of these data, 
CHold checks the integrity of the message then the STA 
identity (IDSTA). If this value exists in its base, CHold 
continues this re-authentication procedure by calculating 
the value (RespCHold) which constitutes the result of the 
application of the challenge1 value with the preset 
algorithms between the whole of CHs existed in the same 
Mesh. Then, CHold compares the obtained result and the 
received one (RespCHnew). And if they are identical, the 
re-authentication procedure will be continued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2  Re-authentication procedure for intra-cluster handoff. 
After the legitimacy checking of CHnew, CHold sends 
another value (challenge2) and its answer (RepCHold) in 
order to prove its validity. This information as well as the 
new session key ( K' ) and the authentication parameter 
(Auth) are sent in an enciphered way using the key Kch. 
In addition, to ensure the message integrity, CHold 
transmits a code MICCHold (6).  
 
The CHnew node checks, first of all, the code of integrity. 
Then, it calculates its answer (RepCHnew) and compares 
the obtained value with that received. If they are not 
identical, the re-authentication procedure will be cancelled 
because one of the components seems to be malevolent. If 
not, we check the validity of the access point by testing its 
identity and by comparing the obtained results for the 
nonce value. 
 
The remainder of the re-authentication procedure is similar 
to that announced in the case intra-cluster (stages 5-6).  In 
which, we carry out mutual authentication between 
MAPnew - CHnew, STA-CHnew  and STA-MAPnew. 
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Fig. 3  Re-authentication procedure for inter-cluster handoff. 
4. Performances Evaluation 
This section is devoted to the evaluation of our protocol 
performances. First we have developed a network 
simulator to implement our architecture of Mesh network.  
This simulator specifies various parameters of this type of 
network and to simulate its features to study the effect of 
security during the handoff of the mobile stations. The 
selected network covers 300m×300m comprising 9 MAPs 
and a variable number of clients. To evaluate the 
performances of our solution, we will consider two types 
of traffic:  voice and Web communication. While referring 
on these types of communications as well as the 
parameters of simulation, we evaluate the simulation’s 
results according three criteria: 
  Handoff latency: the time passed between the change 
of point of attachment request and the association with 
the new MAP, 
  Blocking rate: represents the number of blocked 
stations at handoff for the total number of stations that 
require the execution of handoff, 
  Loss rate: represents the number of lost packets for the 
total number of the emitted packets. 
4.1 Handoff Latency 
In this part, we have tested the influence of the increase of 
network population on the value of the handoff latency, 
primary in intra-cluster mobility and then inter-cluster. 
The speed of the nodes is taken randomly between 0 and 
20 m/s. Fig. 4 represents the result of this simulation. 
Initially, we notice an increase in handoff latency 
following the increase in mobile stations number 
throughout the simulation. This augmentation can be 
justified by the intensification of packets’ number and 
thereafter the treatment time. Besides, we almost observe 
linearity on these two paces starting from the value 350 
mobile stations and with 2,73 10
5µs of handoff latency for 
intra-cluster mobility and 2,84 10
5µs for inter-cluster. 
 
By comparing the two curves, we note that the increase of 
handoff latency value in intra-cluster case is lighter than 
that with inter-cluster mobility. This difference is due to 
the additional time taken by any station which moves from 
a cluster to another. Thereafter the difference between the 
realization times of these procedures. Indeed, according to 
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we notice that inter-cluster mobility has 
more exchanged messages with more components. So, we 
need more time to execute the handoff and to ensure the 
mutual authentication between different entities (STA, 
MAPnew, CHnew and CHold). This variance can reach 
the order of 0,13 10
5µs  which enables to save a 
considerable treatment time and to support a better quality 
of service.  
1.Access Request 
 2.EAP-Request/identity 
6. [Auth, K’, challenge2,  
RepCHold]Kch, MICCHold 
5. Mobility Notification Message 
          ([[IDSTA]K, challenge1, 
           RespCHnew]Kch,MICCHnew) 
4.EAP-Response/identity 
(IDCH, [IDSTA]K, [IDMAP, 
NMAP, ResMAP]
K
CHnew) 
7. ID Response 
([K’,NCHold,RespCHold]
K
MAP) 
8. Mobility Notification Message 
(Auth, Challenge, [IDMAP, RspCH]K’, SN) 
Verify MICCHold 
Compute RepCHnew 
Compare  
RepCHold/ RepCHnew 
Verify IDMAP 
Compute ResCHnew 
Compare  
ResCHnew / ResMAP 
Verify IDSTA, 
and MICCHnew 
Compute RespCHold 
Compare  
RespCHold/ RespCHnew 
Verify IDCH 
Compute RespMAP 
Compare  
ResCHnew/ResMAP 
Store K’ 
Compute K’  
and RspSTA 
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Fig. 4  Handoff latency vs. number of mobile stations. 
4.2 Blocking Rate 
A station is considered blocked when exceeding a handoff 
latency interval of threshold. Consequently, this rate 
depends mainly on handoff latency value. Fig. 5 represents 
the simulation’s result of blocking rate according to the 
mobile stations number. For the first values of clients’ 
number, the blocking rate remains null but with the 
increase in network population, the blocking values 
increases more and more. For inter-cluster mobility, 
starting from the value of 50 stations, the blocking rate 
surpasses zero. However in intra-cluster mobility, that is 
happen starting from 80 stations. This result is justified by 
the dependency between blocking rate and handoff latency 
value. Thereafter, this dependency and increase in rate 
value can degrade the network quality of services, in 
particular at the time of handoff. Moreover, the 
comparison between the two paces clarifies a little 
difference which can reach the value of 2%. 
 
 
Fig. 5  Blocking rate vs. number of mobile stations. 
4.3 Loss Rate 
In order to control the feature of such network, we can 
establish multiple communications between stations and 
while referring to the quantity of lost packets, we can 
determine the nature and the quality of connection. Thus, a 
packet is supposed lost if it goes beyond a delay. Fig. 6 
shows the result of the loss rate according to the mobile 
stations number. As in blocking rate case, the two curves 
start with zero values. That is due to the small quantity of 
mobile stations and thereafter the few packets number 
circulating in network. However, for inter-cluster handoff 
and starting from the value of 40 stations the packets begin 
to be lost and this loss becomes more and more bulky with 
population increase. On the other hand, for intra-cluster 
handoff, this growth starts from the value of 80 stations. 
This increase in both curves is due to the overloading in 
packets queues. 
 
 
Fig. 6  Loss rate vs. number of mobile stations. 
Moreover, as long as the loss rate value < 1%, we benefit 
from an acceptable quality of service. On the other hand, if 
this rate exceeds this value, the quality of service in this 
network is degraded more and more. By comparing the 
two paces, we note that the carrying out of intra-cluster 
handoff gives a light increase in loss rate compared to the 
second handoff type. 
  
According to tests carried out on the two handoff types; 
intra-cluster and inter-cluster, while basing on the criteria 
of handoff latency, blocking and loss rate as well as the 
interpretation of the fulfilled curves in several scenarios, 
we can conclude that our protocol represents satisfactory 
and optimal value of handoff latency with minimum of IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 8, Issue 3, No. 2, May 2011 
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blocked station number during handoff and also few lost 
packets quantity in Mesh network. 
 
Thereafter, we could highlight and justify the difference 
between intra-cluster and inter-cluster handoff results by 
the time held for each station in order to cross the 
coverage of a cluster towards another cluster. Indeed, the 
necessary time to carry out the re-authentication procedure 
becomes increasingly high because we must ensure the 
mutual authentication between the various intervening 
components during this phase. Thus, the proposed re-
authentication and handoff notification protocol provides 
numerous advantages over the existing techniques. Major 
advantages are: 
  this protocol treats two aspects in the same time ; 
mobility and security and also during different 
handoff cases; intra-cluster and inter-cluster which 
may ensure a protected, reliable and resistant 
network against the attacks as well as a more optimal 
and adequate quality of service to clients' 
requirements.   
 The suggested solution can be adapted in various 
types of wireless networks and not only in the case of 
Mesh network. 
 Hierarchical architecture based on a clustering 
algorithm, reduced the rate of exchanged messages 
during the handoff. That makes it possible to reduce 
the load of the authentication server if it exists.  
5. Conclusion 
To allow users to carry out an effective and reliable 
handoff as well as a secure access to WMN  a method of 
re-authentication, with a reduced delay, should be 
executed during the cross of the mobile nodes by different 
MAPs and through various clusters. Indeed, a mobility 
mechanism cannot prove its effectiveness only if it is 
associated to a well defined and studied security 
mechanism. In this paper, we have proposed a new 
solution to solve this problem of insecurity during handoff 
by defining a new protocol for handoff identification and 
re-authentication. This solution has been studied for both 
types of mobility; inter-cluster and intra-cluster. Then, we 
could extract various results following the development of 
a network simulator on which we have tested our proposed 
protocol. According to the comparison between the results 
of several scenarios, we noted that both handoff types can 
provide a protected mechanism and an effective re-
authentication scheme in term of the minimized value of 
handoff latency as well as the reduced blocking and loss 
rates. But, according to simulation results, we have 
noticed that intra-cluster handoff protocol give more 
satisfactory values than the inter-cluster because it 
required more signal transmission. In the future, we plan 
to expand our study by fulfilling some testbed with a real 
environment of Wireless Mesh Network. This will allow 
exploring the performance of our proposed re-
authentication protocol for multiple scenarios. Finally, we 
hope to ameliorate the proposed solution to solve the 
problem of security while handoff, which is carried out 
inside a changeable architecture (i.e. with mobile MPs).  
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